Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Banking Industry. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Banking Industry. Afficher tous les articles

dimanche 22 janvier 2012

Economists: A Profession at Sea by Robert Johnson

Economists: A Profession at Sea

How to keep economists from missing the next financial crisis.
Illustration by O.O.P.S. for TIME
ILLUSTRATION BY O.O.P.S. FOR TIME

After the financial crisis of 2008, the Queen of England asked economists, “Why did no one see the credit crunch coming?” Three years later, a group of Harvard under­graduate students walked out of introductory economics and wrote, “Today, we are walking out of your class, ­Economics 101, in order to express our discontent with the bias inherent in this introductory economics course. We are deeply concerned about the way that this bias affects students, the University, and our greater society.”

What has happened? Rebellion from both above and below suggests that economists, who were recently at the core of power and social leadership in our society, are no longer trusted. Not long ago, the principal theories of economics appeared to be the secular religion of society. Today, economics is a discipline in disrepute. It’s as if our ship of state broke from its stable mooring and unexpectedly slammed into the rocks. How could things have gone so spectacularly wrong? And what can be done to repair economics so economists can play a productive role in helping society?

As the Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job illustrated, there is a very lucrative market for false visions of financial-market behavior that legitimate the desires of participants to be unshackled and make more money. But good policy prescriptions are public goods that represent the social good and not just the concentrated financial interests. Unfortunately, as economists beginning with the work of Adam Smith have repeatedly shown, public goods are under­provided in the marketplace. In addition, the reputation of the economics profession is itself a collective good, and those who have tarnished it are not adequately penalized for the damage they do to their fellow professionals when they accept large sums of money in return for marketing a perspective that benefits vested interests.

These are problems that some within economics have been aware of for a long time, but the discipline as a whole has been unable to address them. The onus is on the profession to face these challenges and help lead society off the rocks.

How to Save Economics

first, economists should resist overstating what they actually know. The quest for certainty, as philosopher John Dewey called it in 1929, is a dangerous temptress. In anxious times like the present, experts can gain great favor in society by offering a false resolution of uncertainty. Of course when the falseness is later unmasked as snake oil, the heroic reputation of the expert is shattered. But that tends to happen only after the damage is done.

Second, economists have to recognize the shortcomings of high-powered mathematical models, which are not substitutes for vigilant observation. Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow saw this danger years ago when he exclaimed, “The math takes on a life of its own because the mathematics pushed toward a tendency to prove theories of mathematical, rather than scientific, interest.”

Financial-market models, for instance, tend to be constructed with building blocks that assume stable and anchored expectations. But the long history of financial crises over the past 200 years belies that notion. As far back as 1921, Frank Knight of the University of Chicago made the useful distinction between measurable risk and “unknown unknowns,” which he called radical uncertainty. Knight’s point was that in a period of radical uncertainty, expectations couldn’t be anchored because they have nothing to latch onto. Financial theories and regulatory designs that hinge on the assumption of stable and anchored expectations are not resilient enough to meet the challenges presented by real financial markets in radically uncertain times.

The third remedy for repairing economics is to reintroduce context. More research on economic history and evidence-based studies are needed to understand the economy and overcome the mechanistic bare-bones models the students at Harvard objected to being taught.

But the economic orthodoxy continues its romance with the Enlightenment tradition of Cartesian “universal laws.” This began after the Thirty Years’ War, when society demanded both a method of investigation that did not antagonize religious factions and universal abstract laws and principles that could be objectively proven. Lost to the traumas of religious and social turmoil were the humble and pragmatic humanistic approaches of Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne and the suppleness of William Shakespeare. Reorienting economics away from the Enlightenment glamour of high theory and returning it to focusing on real problems, in the same way a clinical physician does, would make economics more relevant.

The profession needs to realign the incentives for doing reputable research in order to protect its integrity as a whole, as is done in medicine. Recent policies announced by the American Economic Association on disclosing conflicts of interest are a step in a healthy direction. Faculty members should also be forced to step down from consulting at the time they receive tenure.

Fourth, we must acknowledge the intimate, inseparable relationship between politics and economics. Modern debates about who caused the financial crisis—­government or the private financial sector—are almost ­nonsensical. We are living in an era of money politics and large powerful interests that influence the laws and regulations and their enforcement. In order to catalyze the evolution of economics, research teams would benefit from multidisciplinary interaction with politics, psychology, anthropology, sociology and history.

Such interdisciplinary communication would also benefit another neglected area of economics: the study of macroeconomic systems. Psychologists mock what economists call the micro­foundations of consumer behavior—a set of assumptions based on the idea that isolated individuals behave with clear knowledge of the future. That this framework is suitable for aggregate systems in a globalized economy simply because the tribe called economics has agreed to adhere to these ad hoc assumptions makes no sense. Increased interactions with disciplines that economists have often mocked as unscientific would greatly improve economists’ understanding of the real world and would be more truly scientific.

Many of these suggestions have been argued within the profession as far back as the formation of the American Economic Association in the late 19th century. Its committee on graduate economics education, a panel created in the early 1990s to take stock of the field, as well as the work of economist David Colander and others, has repeatedly illuminated these concerns with economic method and education. It is only now, with the force of recent events so damaging to societies everywhere on earth, and with the rise of developing countries that see the shortcomings of the economic orthodoxy’s prescriptions, that the resistance to renewing the economics profession may be overcome. Until then, we are ­really at sea without an anchor.

Johnson is the executive director of the Institute for New Economic Thinking in New York City and a former managing director at Soros Fund Management. He also serves on the U.N. Commission of Experts on International Monetary Reform



Read more: http://business.time.com/2012/01/19/economists-a-profession-at-sea/#ixzz1kDg3j67b

jeudi 3 novembre 2011

Austerity, pain and other choices..

The Path Not Taken

REYKJAVIK, Iceland

Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

Paul Krugman

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Financial markets are cheering the deal that emerged from Brussels early Thursday morning. Indeed, relative to what could have happened — an acrimonious failure to agree on anything — the fact that European leaders agreed on something, however vague the details and however inadequate it may prove, is a positive development.

But it’s worth stepping back to look at the larger picture, namely the abject failure of an economic doctrine — a doctrine that has inflicted huge damage both in Europe and in the United States.

The doctrine in question amounts to the assertion that, in the aftermath of a financial crisis, banks must be bailed out but the general public must pay the price. So a crisis brought on by deregulation becomes a reason to move even further to the right; a time of mass unemployment, instead of spurring public efforts to create jobs, becomes an era of austerity, in which government spending and social programs are slashed.

This doctrine was sold both with claims that there was no alternative — that both bailouts and spending cuts were necessary to satisfy financial markets — and with claims that fiscal austerity would actually create jobs. The idea was that spending cuts would make consumers and businesses more confident. And this confidence would supposedly stimulate private spending, more than offsetting the depressing effects of government cutbacks.

Some economists weren’t convinced. One caustic critic referred to claims about the expansionary effects of austerity as amounting to belief in the “confidence fairy.” O.K., that was me.

But the doctrine has, nonetheless, been extremely influential. Expansionary austerity, in particular, has been championed both by Republicans in Congress and by the European Central Bank, which last year urged all European governments — not just those in fiscal distress — to engage in “fiscal consolidation.”

And when David Cameron became Britain’s prime minster last year, he immediately embarked on a program of spending cuts in the belief that this would actually boost the economy — a decision that was greeted with fawning praise by many American pundits.

Now, however, the results are in, and the picture isn’t pretty. Greece has been pushed by its austerity measures into an ever-deepening slump — and that slump, not lack of effort on the part of the Greek government, was the reason a classified report to European leaders concluded last week that the existing program there was unworkable. Britain’s economy has stalled under the impact of austerity, and confidence from both businesses and consumers has slumped, not soared.

Maybe the most telling thing is what now passes for a success story. A few months ago various pundits began hailing the achievements of Latvia, which in the aftermath of a terrible recession, nonetheless, managed to reduce its budget deficit and convince markets that it was fiscally sound. That was, indeed, impressive, but it came at the cost of 16 percent unemployment and an economy that, while finally growing, is still 18 percent smaller than it was before the crisis.

So bailing out the banks while punishing workers is not, in fact, a recipe for prosperity. But was there any alternative? Well, that’s why I’m in Iceland, attending a conference about the country that did something different.

If you’ve been reading accounts of the financial crisis, or watching film treatments like the excellent “Inside Job,” you know that Iceland was supposed to be the ultimate economic disaster story: its runaway bankers saddled the country with huge debts and seemed to leave the nation in a hopeless position.

But a funny thing happened on the way to economic Armageddon: Iceland’s very desperation made conventional behavior impossible, freeing the nation to break the rules. Where everyone else bailed out the bankers and made the public pay the price, Iceland let the banks go bust and actually expanded its social safety net. Where everyone else was fixated on trying to placate international investors, Iceland imposed temporary controls on the movement of capital to give itself room to maneuver.

So how’s it going? Iceland hasn’t avoided major economic damage or a significant drop in living standards. But it has managed to limit both the rise in unemployment and the suffering of the most vulnerable; the social safety net has survived intact, as has the basic decency of its society. “Things could have been a lot worse” may not be the most stirring of slogans, but when everyone expected utter disaster, it amounts to a policy triumph.

And there’s a lesson here for the rest of us: The suffering that so many of our citizens are facing is unnecessary. If this is a time of incredible pain and a much harsher society, that was a choice. It didn’t and doesn’t have to be this way.

mercredi 19 octobre 2011

Payroll, managers, inflation and Austerity...

Banques européennes : seules les rémunérations des patrons ne connaissent pas la crise

La rémunération totale des dirigeants de grandes banques a progressé de 12,5% en 2010, selon AlphaValue, alors que le secteur bancaire a perdu 11,5 % de sa valeur en Bourse. Découvrez les pays d'Europe où elles sont les plus élevées et ceux où elles ont le plus augmenté.

Voilà qui ne va pas réconcilier la vox populi avec l'univers de la finance. Ni apaiser le climat social tendu au sein des banques. En 2010, la rémunération (en cash et en stock-options) des dirigeants des banques européennes - aujourd'hui appelées à se recapitaliser en urgence - a grimpé de 12,5 %, à 380 millions d'euros au total, selon une étude du cabinet AlphaValue. Non seulement cette somme est supérieure de 40 % à la moyenne des autres secteurs d'activité, d'après le bureau de recherches, mais, surtout, le parcours boursier des banques n'est pas à l'avenant. L'an dernier, l'indice Bloomberg des services financiers en Europe s'est affaissé de 11,5 %, soit une baisse plus importante que celle du Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 (-7,5 %). L'écart s'est encore creusé depuis janvier, crise de la dette dans la zone euro oblige, avec une dégringolade de 30 % des valeurs bancaires européennes, près de deux fois supérieure au repli du marché.

Contradiction

« Les hausses des rémunérations des dirigeants des banques sont en contradiction avec les baisses de valeur supportées par les actionnaires. Elles amplifient la destruction de valeur dans le secteur », s'insurge AlphaValue. Certes, après deux années de crise financière, les grandes banques avaient sensiblement redressé leurs résultats, en 2010. Mais cela n'avait pas empêché le Fonds monétaire international de tirer la sonnette d'alarme dès avril, peu après la saison des résultats annuels, en pointant l'insuffisance des fonds propres des banques européennes. « La crise bancaire actuelle montre que ces augmentations de rémunérations n'étaient tout simplement pas justifiées », insiste AlphaValue.

Des augmentations synonymes d'envolées en France, où la rémunération moyenne des dirigeants de banques a bondi de 44,8 %, en 2010, alors que leurs homologues britanniques ont dû se contenter d'une hausse de 8,3 %. Les états-majors des établissements allemands ont même vu leur rémunération fondre de 7 %, l'an dernier. Mais les banquiers français partaient de beaucoup plus bas, avec une rémunération moyenne de 865.075 euros en 2010, selon AlphaValue, contre 3,3 millions pour leurs confrères d'outre-Rhin et 5,8 millions pour leurs pairs britanniques.

Ces derniers sont les mieux payés d'Europe (voir tableau ci-dessous). À commencer par Bob Diamond, président de Barclays. L'homme pointe à la première place du palmarès des dix PDG les mieux rémunérés du secteur bancaire européen, avec une enveloppe de 11,6 millions d'euros en 2010 (dont un tiers en cash). Ce qui représente une flambée de... 1.700% par rapport à 2009. À noter qu'aucun PDG de banque française ne figure dans ce « top ten ». Pas étonnant, dans ces conditions, que la rémunération moyenne des grands banquiers britanniques représente entre 42 et 65 fois le salaire moyen de leurs employés, contre des multiples de 5 à 15 pour les banques françaises.

Christine Lejoux - 19/10/2011, 21:43
Que batalla se ha librado y ganado en el mundo diciendo estoy a favor del consenso?